Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship

1993

From the Bankruptcy Courts: Eleventh Circuit
Holds That Cross-Collateralization in Postpetition
Financing Arrangement Is Improper
Benjamin Weintraub
Alan N. Resnick
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Benjamin Weintraub and Alan N. Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: Eleventh Circuit Holds That Cross-Collateralization in
Postpetition Financing Arrangement Is Improper, 25 UCC L.J. 271 (1993)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/846

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

From the Bankruptc_y Courts·
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. R,esnipk**

ELEVENTii CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT.
CROSS-COLLATERALIZATION IN
POSTPETITION FINANCING
ARRANGEMENT IS IMPROPER

The success or failure of a chapter
11 reorgan~ation effort often depends on the debtor's ability to obtain new financing ~ed\ately
after the filing of tl}e petition. 'Despite the automatic stay of collection
efforts regarding prepetition liabilities, 1 the debtor's inability to obtain
sufficient postpetition cred~t may
present an unsurmountable barrier
to the continuation of the business
during the case and to the ability to
confirm a feasible plan of reorganization.
The Bankruptcy Code (the Code)
is designed to assist the debtor in
obtaining needed fmancing. 2 First,
Section 364(a) of the Code permits
the debtor to obtain credit in the

* Speci:U Counsel to the law firm Kaye,
Scholer, Fterman, Hays & Handler, New
York, N.Y.; member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
*~ Benjamin Weintraub Distin~ished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead; N.Y.;
Counsel to the law firm of Fried Frank
Harris, Schriver & Jacobson, Ne~ York:
N.Y.; member of the National Bankruptcy
Conference.
'see-.11 u.s.c . ..§ 362.
2
For a discussion of the Code's provisions dea~ing with postpetition financing,
see B. Wemtraub & A. Resnick, Bankruptcy
Law Manual (rev. ed. 1992), 8.11[6].

ordinary, <rourse of b\}~iness without
coutl approval, .resulting in an administrative priority for the creditor. 3 Although this may by sufficient
to induce vendors and other trade
suppliers \o give the debtor shortterm credit as usual, it is not help:t'ul
regarding extensions of credit outside the ordinary course. 'Section
364(b) allows the debtor, with court
approval, to obtain credit outside
the ordinary course, again granting
an administrative priority to the
creditor. 4 However, granting an administrative priority usuallY. is insufficient to induce banks or other
institutional lenders to extend -substantial fmancing to a debtor in possession, often referred to as DIP
financing.
Therefore, Section
364(c) permits the court to order
that a post-petition fmancer have
"superpriority" over all other administrative e}{penses or be secured
by a lien on property of the estate,
if necessary to induce the extension
of credit. 5 If an existing lien is adequately pt.otected, pursuant to Section 364(d), the court may e'(en authorize the granting of a senior lien
when the debtor in possession could
not ·otherwise obtain needed fi:.
nancing. 6
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See 11 U.S.C.
See 11 U.S.C.
See 11 U.S.C.
See 11 U.5'.C.

§ 364(a).
§ 364(b).
§ 364(c).
§ 364(d).
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A common source of· DIP financing is the debtor's prepetition lender. When the debtor seeks postpetition financing from the prepetition
lender, it is common for the lender
to demand that, as a condition to
the extension of credit, the debtor
agrees, with the court's approval,
that the lender be granted a security
interest in the debtor's assets to secure both the-lender's postpetition
claims and the lender's unsecured
prepetition claims. The result of
such an order is to convert flle lender's prepetition nonpriority unsecured claim into a secured claim as
an inducement for the extension of
new postpetition fil}ancing. Because
the new lien secures a prepetition
and postpetitlon debts, this financing arrangement is known as
'' cross-collateralization. ' '
The Code is silent regarding
cross-colla,teralization, .which raises the question of whether bankruptcy courts have the power to authorize it in a case under the Code. The
first court of appeals decision to
comment on its propriety under the
Code was In re Texlon Cqrp. ,7 a
case under Chapter XI of the former
Bankruptcy Act, where the debtor
obtained a court order authorizing
it to grant a postpetition fiQanc~r a
security interest, in all inventory,
equipment, and a,ccounts receivable
of the ,debtor to· secure prepetition
debt as well as new postpetition financing. The court held that the
financing order was improper because it was granted ex parte, thus
7

596 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1979).
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avoiding the necessity of dealing
directly with the question of whether, if notice was proper, the crosscollateralization order could have
been upheld. Most importantly the
court of appeals, in dictum, commented on Section 364 of the Code,
which at that time had not yet become law. "[.W]e see nothing in
§ 364(c) or in the other provisions
of that section that advances the case
in favor of 'cross-collateralization.' " 8 Howeve.r, the court of appeals was quick to add that it would
not go so far as to hold that "under
no' conceivable circumstances could
'cross-collateralization' be authorized.' ' 9 With that brief comment on
a law not even applicable· to that
case, the court of appeals opened the
door enough to allow bankruptcy
courts to grarlt cross-collateral orders in situations in which the courts
were satisfied that the debtor could
not otherwise obtain DIP financing.10

The.Saybrook Decision
Tlie door that was opened in the
Second Circuit in 1979 was closed
completely in the Eleventh Circuit
in 1992 when the court of appeals
decided In re Saybrook Manufacturing Co. 11 The day after Saybrook
Manufac~ring_ Company and relat8

/d. at 1098.
/d.
See, e.g., In re Vanguard Diversified,
Inc., 31 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1983); In re Roblin Indus., Inc., 52 Bankr.
241 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985). Contra, e.g.,
InreMonach Circuit Indus., Inc., 41 Bankr.
859-(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
11
963 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1992).
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ed companies flied Chapt~r 11 petitions, the debtors flied a motion fpr,
among other things, authorization
to borrow $3 million from a bank
that held prepetition claims against
the d~btors. The new $3 million
loan, secured by a security interest
in the deptor' s assets, was n~~ssary
to faciJitate the reorganization effort. On t:Qe fliing date, the bank
was already owed $34 million that
was secured by less than $10 million
worth of collateral, leaving a prepetition unsecured npnpriority claim
of more than $24 million. The bankruptcy court entered an emergency
financing order that same day authorizing the debtors to grant the
bank a security interest. The fmancing arrangement included a crosscollateralization provision granting
the bank a security interest in all
of the debtors: property-including
property owned prior to fliing the
bankruptcy petition and property
that is.. acquired post petition-to secure both the $3 million of postpetition credit and the entire $34 million
prepetition debt.
It is not surprising that two unsecured'creditors objected to•this financing arrangement, which greatly
enhanced tlte bank's position vis-avis other unsecured creditors in the
event of liqlti,dation. As the court of
appeals indicated, since the bank's
.prepetition debt was undersecured
by more than $24 million, "It originally would have shared in a pro
rate distribution of the debtor's unencumbered assets along with the
other unsecured creditors. Under

the financing order, however, [the
bank's] prepetition debt became fully secured by all of the debtors'
assets. If the bankruptcy estate were
liquidated, [the bank's] entire
debt-$34 million prepetition and
$3 million postpetition-woulq
have to be paid in full before any
funds could be distributed to the
remaining unsecured creditors. '' 12
The court of appeals in Saybrook
distinguished two different forms
of cross-collateralization. '' Texlontype cross-collateralization'' involves the granting of a lien on
the debtor's pre- and postpetition
collateral to secure prepetition
claims as well as postpetition debt.
Another type of cross-collateralization that was not involved in that
case is the securing of postpetition
debt with prepetition collateral. The
two objecting unsecured creditors in
Sayqrook challenged only the crosscollateralization of the bank's prepetition debt, not the collateralizatio~ of the postpetition debt.
Mootness Doctrine

The bankruptcy court, after a
hearing, overruled the objections to
the financing order made by the
two objecting unsecured creditors.
After a notice of appeal was flied,
the court denied their request for a
stay pending appeal and subsequently dismissed the appeal as
moot under Section 364(e), which
provides that:
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/d. at 1491.
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The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under this
section to obtain credit or incur debt,
or of a grant under this section of a
priority or a lien, does not affect the
validity of any debt so incurred, or
any priority or lien so granted, to an
entity that extended such credit in
good faith, whether or not such entity
knew of the pendency of the appeal,
unless such authorization and the incurring of such debt, or the granting
of such priority or lien, wen~ stayed
pending appeal. 13

The principle stated in that section of the Code is often referred to
as the ''mootness doctrine'' because
it effectively renders moot any appeal attacking the legality of a postpetition financing order in favor of
a good faith lender in the absence
of a stay pending appeal. As the
court of appeals stated in Saybrook,
"[t]he purpose of this provision is
to encourage the extension of credit
to debtors in bankruptcy by eliminating the risk that any lien securing
the loan will be modified on appeal. " 14 The bank argued that Section 364(e) prohibits the court of
appeals from reviewing the propriety of the fmancing order, and cited
several cases, including the Ninth
Circuit decision in In re Adams
Apple, Inc., 15 and the Sixth Circuit
decision in In re Ellingsen MacLean
Oil Co. , 16 where the courts had refused to consider the merits of the

question regarding the propriety of
cross-collateralization because of
the mootness doctrine.
The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, rejecting the reasoning of the court in Adams Apple
and Ellingsen, held that the mootness doctrine does not prohibit appellate review of a financing order
involving cross-collateralization. In
essence, Adams Apple and Ellingsen
"put the cart before the horse" because Section 364(e) only protects
from review those postpetition financing orders that are "author. ized" under Section 364. 17 "We
cannot determine if this appeal is
moot under Section 364(e) until we
decide the central issue in this appeal-whether cross-collateralization is authorized under section
364. " 18 By holding that Section
364(e) does not bar appellate review, the court of appeals removed
a long-standing obstacle that had
been frustrating the attempts of unsecured creditors to obtain any court
of appeals review of cross-collateralization orders. 19
The Impropriety of CrossCollateralization
The court of appeals in Saybrook
then turned to the merits of the issue,
which the court recognized as "ex17 In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., note 11
supra, 963 F.2d at 1493.

13

18Jd.

14

19

11 U.S.C. § 364(e).
In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., note 11
supra, 963 F.2dat 1493.
15
829 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir. 1987).
16
834 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
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For a discussion of this obstacle to
appellate review, see Tabb, "Lender Preference Clauses and the Destruction of Appealability and Finality: Resolving a Chapter 11
Dilemma," 50 Ohio St. L.J. 109 (1989).
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tremely controversial, " 20 regarding
the propriety of cross-collateralization in a case under the Code. Despite this controversy, however, the
coun was· facing a question of first
impression that has never been directly decided by any court of appeals. This lack of appellate authority was due primarily to the
widespread application of the mootness doctrine under Section 364(e).
:rhe court of appeals noted that
the bankruptcy courts that have permitted cross-collateralizatidn usually. have done so with great reluctance and only after the debtors have
satisfied a four-part test that required the debtor to demonstrate:

First, cross-collateralization is not
authorized as a method of post-petition fmancing under Section 364.
Second cross-collateralization is beyond the scope of the bankruptcy
court's inherent equitable power because it is directly contrary to the
fundamental pri?rity scheme of the
Bankruptcy Code. 22

Focusing on the language of Section 364, the court conchided that
"[b]y their express terms, sections
364(c) & (d) apply only to futurei.e., post-petition-extensions of
cred!t. TheY. do not authorize the
granting of liens to secure pre-petition loans. " 23 In particular, the
court emphasized certain phrases of
the statute:

( 1) tha~ its business operations would
fail absent the proposed fmancing,
(2) that it is unable to obtain alternative fmancing on acceptable terms,
(3) that the proposed lender will not
accept less preferential terms and
(4) that the proposed finailcin~ is in
the general creditor body's interest. 21

(c) If the trustee is unable to obtain
unsecured credit allowable under
section 503(b)(1) of this title as an
administrative expense, the court,
after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the
incurring ofdebt
-(1) with p?ority over any or

The court of appeals then held
that cross-collateralization is not a
permissible means of obtaining financing in a case under the Code.
After commenting that cross-collateralization is not specifically mentioned in the Code, the court concluded that the practice is
inconsistent with the bankruptcy
law for two reasons.

all administrative expenses of the
kind sp~ified in section 503(b) or
507(b) of this title;
(2) secured by a lien on property
of the estate that is not otherwise
subject to a lien; or
(3) secured by a junior lien on
property of the estate that is not
otherwise subject to a lien;
(d) (1) The coqrt, after notice and a
hearing, may authorize the obtaining

20

In re Saybro9k Mfg. Co., note 11
supra, 963 F.2d at'1493.
21
See, e.g., In re Vanguard Diversified
Inc., note 10 supra, 31 Bankr. at 364, 366~
In re Roblin Indus., Inc., note 10 supra, 52
Bankr. at 244-245.

22
In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., note 11
supra, 963 F.2dat 1494-1495.
23
Id. at 1495.

275

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW JOURNAL

that .... As a result of this practice,
post-petition lenders' unsecured pre,petition qlaims are given priority
over all other unsecured pre-petition
,claims. 27

ofcredit or incurring ofdebt secured
by .a senior or equal lien on property
of the estate that is subject· to a lien
only if-

(A) the trustee is unable to obtain
such credit otherwis~; and '
(B) there is adequate protectioil: of
the interest of the holder of the lien
on the property of the estate on
which such senior or equal lien is
proposed to be granted. 24

Quoting from an opinion of the
bankruptcy court in In re Monach
Circuit Industries, Inc. ,25 the court
of appeals reasoned that "[T]he
terms of § 364(c) appear to limit the
extent of the priority or lien to the
amount of the credit obtained or
debt incurred after court approval. " 26
Focusing on the bank's argument
that bankruptcy courts may permit
cross-collateralization under their
general equitable powers, the court
of appeals stated that the court's
equitable power to avoid injustice
or unfairness is not unlimited.
Section 507 of the Bankruptqy Code
fixes the priority order of claims and
expenses against the bankruptcy estate . . . . Creditors within a given
class are to be treated equally, and
bankruptcy courts may not create
their own rules of superpriority within a single class .... Cross-collateralization, however, does exactly
24
/d., quoting from 11 U.S.C.
§§ 364(c), 364(d) (emphasis added).
25
41 Bankr. at 859.
26 963 F.2d at 1495, quoting from In re
Monach Circuit Indus., Inc., note 10 supra,
41 Bankr. at 862 (emphasis in original).
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The ,court of appeals in Saybrook
also rejected ,the argument that
cross-collateralization may.be justified as being consistent with the
bankruptcy policy of helping businesses to reorganize and become
profitable. ''Rehabilitation is certainly the primary purpose of Chapter) 1. This end, however, does not
justify the use of any means. Crosscollateralization is directly inconsisteot with the .priority scheme of
th~ Bankruptcy Code. Acco,rdingly,
the practice may not be approved
by the bankruptcy court under its
equitable authority. ''28
In sum, the court of appeals held
that, since cross-collateralization is
not explicitly authorized by the
Code and is contrary to the basic
priority structure of the Code, the
mootness doctrine under Section
364(e) is not applicable. The order
of the district coutt was reversed
and the proceeding was remanded.
Conclusion
It probably will take some time
before the actual effects of the Saybrook decision become known in
the Eleventh Circuit. Will debtors
have ;nore difficulty obtaining DIP
financing because they no longer
can induce their prepetition lenders
to extend additional fmancing by
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/d., 963 F~2d at 1495-1496.
ld. at 1496.
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offering them the opportunity to
convert their pre-petition unsecured
claims to secured claims? Or will
the effect be minimal because lenders will still have sufficient incentive in seeing the debtor reorganize
successfully so that prepetition
claims will be paid, while feeling
secure regarding postpetition advances extended on a senior secured
basis. We never really know how
effectiye the carrot is in 1nducing
behavior until it is gone.
It also remains to be seen whether
other circuits will follow the holding
in Saybrook. However, its impact
in other sircuits that have not faced
these issues may be as significant as

it will be in the Eleventh Circuit

beca~se ~f the court's removal of
the mootness doctrine shield against
appellate review of orders authoriz-~
ing cross-collateralization. In essence, a lender offered cross-collateralization in another circuit may
find little comfort in a bankiuptcy
court order approving the financing
arrangement because of the possibility that the court of appeals in that
circuit may then rule that Section
364(e) offe~s no protection against
subsequent attack. The sanctity of
cross-collateralization orders has
been placed, under a cloud that may,
or possibly may not, repder it more
difficult to obtain needed DIP financing.
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